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MAY PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES RESTRICT FACULTY FROM RECEIVING OR
TRANSMITTING INFORMATION VIA UNIVERSITY COMPUTER RESOURCES?
ACADEMIC FREEDOM, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE INTERNET
Introduction
The Internet' is arguably the most powerful and useful tool ever
developed for transmitting and receiving information.' Access to the
Internet permits a person to educate him or herself on topics as "di-
verse as human thought."3 Imposing restrictions on the content a per-
son is able to receive via the Internet denies that person the ability to
utilize a priceless tool for acquiring a complete panorama of informa-
tion on any given topic prior to formulating an opinion which may, in
turn, be used to stimulate valuable public discourse. No greater harm
is caused by conditioning access to the Internet than in the university
setting where, according to the Supreme Court, "[t]eachers and stu-
dents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
1. The Federal Networking Council (FNC) defines the term "Internet" to refer to the
global information system that
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the
Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons;
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/
or other IP-compatible protocols; and
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level ser-
vices layered on the communications and related infrastructure described herein.
FNC Resolution: Definition of "Internet" (Oct. 24, 1995).
2. See Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 638 (E.D. Va. 1998) (describing the Internet
as "arguably the most powerful tool for sharing information ever developed"). Even the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the power of the Internet in Reno v. ACLU, stating:
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the
outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called "ARPANET," which
was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense contractors,
and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with one
another by redundant channels even if some portions of the network were dam-
aged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an example for
the development of a number of civilian networks that, eventually linking with
each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate with one an-
other and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. The
Internet is "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication."
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844
(E.D. Pa. 1996)).
3. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852 (discussing the uses and potential of the Internet, and
noting the finding of the district court that "[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that the
content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842)).
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gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die."4
The notion of academic freedom has been defined by the Court
as being both the freedom of the university "to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study,"5 and the freedom of indi-
vidual members of the faculty "to inquire, to study and to evaluate."6
No specific enumeration of any right to academic freedom appears in
the Constitution; nevertheless, the Court has indicated in its decisions
that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amend-
ment."7 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also declared
that the government, acting as an employer, has the ability to restrict
certain otherwise protected First Amendment rights of its employees if
there are legitimate work-related interests at stake.8 Hence, a conflict
arises between the academic freedom of the faculty at a public univer-
sity and restrictions on access to the Internet via university maintained
computers or networks imposed by the institution acting as a public
employer.
This Comment explores whether government regulation of
faculty Internet access at public universities violates substantial First
Amendment rights.9 In the past, courts have analyzed First Amend-
ment cases involving university faculty and academic freedom from
the standpoint of a faculty member's right to disseminate speech on
matters of public concern. l This Comment approaches the issue in a
4. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
5. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 251.
7. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing the relation-
ship between academic freedom and the First Amendment and emphasizing the impor-
tance such a freedom has in preserving the "robust exchange of ideas" which underpins
the First Amendment and essence of democracy); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the ight of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." Id.
8. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (explaining that the government
has the right to restrict the speech of its employees in the interests of achieving its goals as
efficiently and effectively as possible, even though the government could not restrict the
same speech of the public at large).
9. Private universities can infringe on the speech of their faculty because the right to
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment only applies to government conduct.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-95 (analyzing the ability of faculty members to speak
out in the classroom and university setting under the umbrella law requiring professors to
sign a certification that they were not Communists); Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 674
(8th Cir. 1997) (discussing the First Amendment protection afforded to public university
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slightly different manner, arguing that the primary First Amendment
right at issue in cases involving faculty access to the Internet is not the
right to speak, but rather the right to receive speech. No court has
ever explicitly addressed the right to receive speech in a First Amend-
ment case involving government employment.1" The Supreme Court,
however, has established that the right to receive speech is a distinct
and wholly separate First Amendment right that enjoys full constitu-
tional protection." Furthermore, not only is the right of faculty mem-
bers to receive speech implicated by restricting Internet access, the
right of the general citizenry to receive speech from public employees
for the purpose of stimulating valuable discourse on matters of public
concern is likewise implicated.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AFFORDED TO THE RIGHT TO
RECEIVE INFORMATION
The Internet is both a resource for gathering information pro-
duced by other individuals and a forum for disseminating one's own
opinions and accumulated knowledge. The right to receive speech or
information is a corollary right to the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech, and the Supreme Court has afforded it similar
constitutional protection."3 Faculty at higher institutions of learning
rely heavily on the right to receive information, since research with an
eye toward publication is of primary concern to them. The develop-
ment of the Internet over the past decade has provided faculty with a
new and extremely powerful tool for conducting research, and limit-
ing the right of faculty to access certain information on the Internet
directly conflicts with their constitutionally protected right to receive
information.
faculty members' ability to place certain controversial pictures in a public display case lo-
cated within an academic department); Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln Univ.,
635 F.2d 216, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying the public employee speech doctrine to
professors who claimed that the conduct of administrators "violated their constitutional
right to engage in spirited criticism of administrative policies with which they disagree").
11. See Dana R. Wagner, Note, The First Amendment and the Right to Hear, 108 YALE L.J.
669, 673 (1998) (noting, however, that "there have been some cases which have clearly
implicated public employees' interests as listeners, most notably those involving restrictions
on the provision of information to military personnel" (footnote omitted)).
12. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that "the right of
the public [to receive suitable access to speech] ... may not constitutionally be abridged
... by Congress").
13. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (discussing the variety
of contexts in which the Court has considered a First Amendment right to "receive infor-
mation and ideas" and restating the well established proposition that the First Amendment
freedom of speech and press "necessarily protects the right to receive").
[VOL. 59:13981400
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A. History of the Right to Receive Information
The Supreme Court first considered whether a separate constitu-
tionally protected right to receive certain speech existed in Meyer v.
Nebraska.14 Meyer involved a suit against the State of Nebraska that
challenged a state law which prohibited school teachers from in-
structing students in grade eight or below in any modern language
other than English.15 The Court held that the Nebraska law violated
the Fourteenth Amendment 6 right of citizens to contract freely for
the purpose of receiving knowledge. 7 According to the Court, par-
ents have the right to select a certain type of instruction for their chil-
dren that will provide them with an opportunity to acquire
knowledge, a fundamental right which is of "supreme importance" to
the nation and American people.1 8 The Court explained that to suc-
cessfully deny a child the right to learn languages other than English,
a state would be required to show some emergency rendering knowl-
edge of other languages substantially harmful.1 9 Thus, the Court rec-
ognized the importance of the right to receive speech by stressing that
only proof of substantial harm would justify "its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed."2" A potential
listener or recipient of information, under Meyer, therefore, has the
right to contract with a speaker in order to learn and grow as a con-
tributing member of society.
In Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States,2 1 the Court spe-
cifically recognized the right to receive information as a corollary to
the First Amendment right to free speech. The Lamont Court ad-
dressed a constitutional challenge to the Postal Service and Federal
Employees Salary Act of 1962.22 This Act permitted the Postmaster
General to withhold mail matter which originated, or was printed, in a
foreign country and was determined to be communist political propa-
14. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
15. See id. at 397 (citing Nebraska Laws (1919, c. 249)). The Nebraska law which the
Court held to be unconstitutional stated in relevant part, "[n]o person, individually or as a
teacher shall ... teach any subject in any language other than the English language ...
[unless after] the eighth grade." Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
18. See id. at 400-01.
19. See id. at 403 ("No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of
some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed.").
20. Id.
21. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
22. 76 Stat. 840 (1962).
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ganda.23 Under the statute, the Postmaster General was required to
notify the addressee of the mail matter's existence and was permitted
to retain the mail until such time as the addressee indicated that he or
she wished to receive the information. 24 The Court concluded that
the statute, as construed and applied, was unconstitutional because
the requirement of an official act on the part of the addressee (re-
turning a reply card indicating a desire to receive the communist
propaganda) served as "a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the
addressee's First Amendment rights."'25 As illustrated in Lamont, the
express free speech guarantee of the First Amendment includes the
right of the people to have mail delivered without governmental regu-
lation which impinges upon the flow of ideas.2 6
Lamont stands for the proposition that citizens have the right to
send for information even if the federal government has condemned
such information as evil communist political propaganda. 2v The stat-
ute at issue in Lamont interfered with the "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First
Amendment," and as such, it could not stand. 8 Just as the First
Amendment protects the right to disseminate speech, it "necessarily
protects the right to receive it."'29 Were a person's right to receive
publications left unprotected, the right to disseminate speech ex-
pressly protected by the First Amendment would be worthless because
willing recipients would be unable to receive and consider those pro-
tected ideas.3" As Justice Brennan explained in his concurring opin-
ion in Lamont. "It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers."31
The "right to learn" recognized in Meyer as a substantive due pro-
cess right under the Fourteenth Amendment was extended under the
rubric of the First Amendment in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
23. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302.
24. See id. at 303 (explaining that the Post Office complied with the notification terms
of the statute by requiring that the addressee be "mailed a notice identifying the mail
being detained and advising that it will be destroyed unless the addressee requests delivery
by returning an attached reply card").
25. Id. at 305.
26. See id. at 306.
27. See id. at 307.
28. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
29. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943)).
30. See id.
31. Id. Justice Brennan further stated that the Court cannot sustain an intrusion into
First Amendment rights on the ground that the intrusion is only a minor one. See id. at
309-10 ("In the area of First Amendment freedoms, government has the duty to confine
itself to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purpose.").
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Communications Commission.3 2 Red Lion involved a constitutional and
statutory challenge to an FCC practice known as the "fairness doc-
trine."" This doctrine required broadcast stations discussing public
issues to present such issues in a manner which afforded each propo-
nent fair coverage of its respective position.14 The case addressed a
particular application of the fairness doctrine whereby an individual,
who was personally attacked by the Red Lion Broadcasting Company
on air, was entitled to free time to reply to the attacks." When the
station denied reply time, the party complained to the FCC, which
then ordered Red Lion to provide free reply time.36 The Court held
that the FCC did not exceed its authority in requiring Red Lion to
provide reply time, and in doing so upheld the fairness doctrine as
constitutional.3 7
The First Amendment challenge in Red Lion was that the fairness
doctrine abridged broadcasters' freedom of speech and press. 38 Jus-
tice White, writing for the Court, began his analysis of the First
Amendment issues by stating that "differences in the characteristics of
new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards ap-
plied to them."3 9 This statement is particularly instructive with respect
to the topic of this Comment because not only was the right to receive
speech implicated by the case, but technological advances like broad-
casting, and by analogy the Internet, were deemed to necessitate new
approaches to First Amendment analysis. The paramount First
Amendment issue presented in Red Lion, according to the Court, was
not the right of the broadcasters to speak, but the right of viewers and
listeners to receive speech such that the First Amendment goal of pro-
ducing "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail" could be preserved.4" AsJustice White wrote: "It is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or
by the FCC."4 1
32. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
33. Id. at 370.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 371-72.
36. See id. at 372.
37. See id. at 400-01.
38. See id. at 386.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 390.
41. Id.
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During the decade after Red Lion, the Court began to further rec-
ognize specific instances in which the right to learn and receive
speech was a necessary corollary to the right to speak. For example, in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,4 2 the Court recognized the right of consumers to receive com-
mercial speech from pharmacists wishing to advertise prescription
drug prices.4" The Court held a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists
from advertising the prices of prescription drugs unconstitutional,"
and explained that members of a consumer group had standing to
assert their claim because "if there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising, [which may be asserted] .""4
The protection of freedom of speech afforded by the First Amend-
ment presupposes a willing speaker, and where one exists, the Court
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy determined that the protections af-
forded to the communication extends to both the source of the com-
munication and to its recipients.46
Another case of particular importance to the development of the
right to receive speech involved a constitutional challenge to the U.S.
Attorney General's denial of a visa to a foreigner wishing to speak in
the United States.4 7 In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the alien speaker had no
constitutionally protected right to speak in the United States; thus, the
Court focused its discussion and decision on whether members of the
American public had the right to sue to enforce their right to hear the
speech of the alien speaker.4" The Court firmly reiterated the pro-
position that the Constitution protects the right to receive informa-
tion and ideas.49 In its review of past cases dealing with the right to
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. See id. at 757. The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court explained that the general
public may have a strong interest in the free flow of certain commercial information. See
id. at 764. Advertising entails the dissemination of information about products, their sell-
ers, and the price they are being sold at, all of which lead to the formation of intelligent
opinions by people as to how they should allocate their resources within a free enterprise
economy. See id. at 765. Similarly, as discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying
notes 186-191, members of the general public have a strong interest in the free flow of
academic speech to aid them in formulating opinions on a wide range of important social
and political topics.
44. See id. at 770.
45. Id. at 757. The question of standing is relevant to this Comment because the gen-
eral public, according to the Court's holding in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, would have
standing to assert a challenge to any restrictions imposed on faculty use of the Internet
based on the public's First Amendment right to receive the valuable faculty speech.
46. See id. at 756.
47. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 754 (1972).
48. See id. at 762.
49. See id. at 762-63 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
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receive speech, the Court emphasized once more that the First
Amendment right to learn ordained in Meyer holds a place of impor-
tance "nowhere more vital" than in the schools and universities of the
country.5 ° Although First Amendment rights were implicated in Klein-
dienst, the Court nevertheless held that the longstanding ability of
Congress to control the admission and exclusion of aliens outweighed
any First Amendment rights.51 In essence, the Kleindienst Court
weighed the First Amendment rights of Americans to receive speech
against the plenary power of Congress, delegated to the Executive
Branch, to regulate the flow of foreigners into the country.5 2 While
the Court based much of its holding on a separation of powers ratio-
nale and a deference to plenary congressional power,5" the case is
nonetheless significant as it demonstrated the Court's recognition of
the right to receive speech as a fundamental guarantee of the Consti-
tution and a right that should be considered in analyzing First Amend-
ment challenges.
B. The Right to Receive Information in Internet Access Cases
The Internet makes a wealth of knowledge accessible to anyone
with basic computer equipment and an Internet Service Provider
(ISP). Receipt of this knowledge is essential to individuals wishing to
educate themselves on current topics of public concern such that they
can form their own opinions on issues. Denying or restricting access
to certain information on the Internet directly implicates the constitu-
tional guarantee of the right to learn and receive information as estab-
lished in First Amendment jurisprudence.54 Undoubtedly, many
people depend on their employment to access the Internet;55 as such,
restricting that access infringes upon the First Amendment right to
receive information insofar as it hampers a person's ability to hear
50. See id. at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
51. See id. at 766-70.
52. See id. at 768-69.
53. See id. at 769-70 (holding that courts will not examine the exercise of Congress'
plenary power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens, nor balance decisions to
exclude aliens under such a power against the First Amendment interests of those seeking
personal communication with the alien).
54. See supra notes 13-53 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment protec-
tion of the right to receive speech).
55. See Wagner, supra note 11, at 675 (arguing that because many public employees
depend on their employment for access to computer technologies, including the Internet,
a government statute restricting the access of certain information would impair the ability
of public employees to acquire such information not easily obtainable from other sources).
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what another speaker exercising a protected right to speak has to
say. 56
In an educational setting, it is well-established that a public uni-
versity administration or school board has a right to regulate the cur-
riculum and control the information disseminated to students by
faculty.57 Consequently, no constitutional rights are violated when a
teacher is restricted from disseminating certain materials obtained on
the Internet to his or her students. The First Amendment issue with
regard to curriculum is the right to speak, and such in-class speech
can be regulated when substantial interests of the students and institu-
tion outweigh any interests the teacher may have in speaking.58 Re-
stricting faculty Internet access in educational settings, however,
implicates a substantial First Amendment concern apart from the
right to speak to students. This concern, equally important to the
right to speak, is the right of educators to receive information for re-
search and self-education purposes.
Limiting, or removing altogether, the right of public employees
to access and view "obscene material" on the Internet is constitution-
ally permissible. In Miller v. California,59 the Court concluded that ob-
scene material may be properly regulated by a state without infringing
on First Amendment rights.60 Obscene materials were defined by the
Court as materials which "taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."'" When the regulated materials are only
56. While a public employer may not have to provide Internet access as a condition of
employment, once it does, certain First Amendment protections arguably attach to its use.
57. While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on a level of First Amendment
protection afforded to the in-class or curricular related speech of teachers, United States
appellate courts have overwhelmingly declared that teachers do not possess a First Amend-
ment right to regulate the curriculum of their students over the wishes of the administra-
tion or school board. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371
(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that public school teachers do not have a First Amendment right
to participate in the makeup of curriculum); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890
F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that "public school teachers are not free, under the
first amendment, to arrogate control of curricula").
58. See generally Boring, 136 F.3d at 371 (explaining that because a public school's cur-
riculum must be established by someone, it is "far better public policy... that the makeup
of the curriculum be entrusted to the local school authorities.., rather than to the teach-
ers, who would be responsible only to the judges, had they a First Amendment right to
participate in the makeup of the curriculum").
59. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
60. See id. at 36-37 (holding that "obscene material is not protected by the First Amend-
ment [and] that such material can be regulated by the States").
61. Id. at 24.
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sexual in nature or are otherwise generally unacceptable yet still pos-
sess some redeeming social importance, however, the First Amend-
ment right of citizens to receive speech is implicated. 62 The cases
which have arisen in recent years concerning Internet access restric-
tions have predominantly involved restrictions imposed on Internet
access to sexually explicit or deviant materials, which are not necessa-
rily obscene according to the Miller definition.63 Courts have ap-
proached these cases from various directions, but none so far have
directly addressed the First Amendment right to receive speech; in-
stead, courts have invalidated Internet access restrictions on other ba-
ses, including the First Amendment right to speak.64
Assuming a willing speaker exists, Internet access restrictions on
the ability of a person to disseminate information through e-mail,
postings on web sites, chat groups, and other Internet forums impli-
cate the First Amendment right to receive information enjoyed by the
citizenry as a whole. For example, in an educational setting, the opin-
ions of a professor have substantial social value to the general public.
Denying a professor the ability to post materials on the Internet un-
dermines the right to receive information and learn of potential recip-
ients of that information, namely the American populace.65 The First
Amendment was intended to encourage discourse on matters of pub-
lic concern. Restricting the dissemination of materials and speech
hampers the ability of other citizens to access valuable speech and, in
turn, reflect and form their own opinions and speech on important
matters of public concern.
62. For purposes of this Comment, the non-obscene material would have to be deemed
a matter of public concern if it is to be properly considered as a potentially protected First
Amendment right under the Court's public employee speech doctrine. See Rankin v. Mc-
Pherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987); infra text accompanying notes 92-140 (discussing the
public employee doctrine).
63. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634
(E.D. Va. 1998); Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997), affd, 133 F.3d 771
(10th Cir. 1998).
64. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-79 (invalidating a restriction on the transmission of
obscene or indecent" messages to minors via the Internet on the basis of the First Amend-
ment right to speak); cf Loving, 956 F. Supp. at 955 (upholding restrictions on access to
certain Internet news groups by reasoning that a public university's computers and In-
ternet services do not constitute a public forum and the state has the right to restrict use of
its facilities to their intended purposes).
65. See, e.g, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470
(1995) (stating that "large scale disincentive to Government employees' expression also
imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees
would otherwise have written and said"); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 638 (E.D.
1998) (involving a state statute restricting Internet access of public employees wherein the
district court states that "equally at stake is the right of the public to receive speech of state
employees on matters within their areas of expertise").
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II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
Exploring judicial deference toward academic freedom is impor-
tant to a discussion of Internet access restriction at public universities
because academic freedom should be an important consideration
when balancing an academic employer's interest in regulating speech
with the employees' and general public's interest in receiving
speech.6 6
While there is no specific enumeration of a right to academic
freedom in the United States Constitution, the Court has recognized
such a right as a "special concern" of the First Amendment.6 7 The
Court focused on protecting the importance of academic freedom
during the 1950s and 60s in response to government efforts to remove
allegedly Communist or insurgent teachers from the nation's aca-
demic institutions.6 ' The first mention of the phrase "academic free-
dom" by the Supreme Court was in the case of Adler v. Board of
Education.69 The Adler Court upheld the constitutionality of a New
York law which permitted the removal of any public employee who
belonged to an organization advocating the overthrow of the govern-
ment by forceful, violent or illegal means.7 ° Notwithstanding the
Court's holding, Adler is a significant decision because justice Douglas,
in his dissenting opinion, identified the notion that academic free-
dom is a subset of the First Amendment. 71 Justice Douglas wrote that
" [t] he Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to
everyone in our society . . . [, ]and none need[ ] it more than the
teacher."7 2 Justice Douglas further explained that the New York law
would place teachers under constant surveillance for any signs of dis-
66. While the Supreme Court has not resolved how academic freedom plays out in the
Pickering balancing test, discussed infra notes 95-107, some lower courts have considered
academic freedom an essential component of the balancing test that places a substantial
burden on the government to justify any restriction on the speech of academics. See, e.g.,
Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997); Trotman v. Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d
216 (3d Cir. 1980); Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975).
67. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing a constitu-
tional commitment to protect academic freedom and holding that the University's require-
ment that members of the faculty attest and certify to the fact that they were not members
of the Communist Party was unconstitutional).
68. See Rachel E. Fugate, Choppy Waters are Forecast for Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 187, 191 (1998) (discussing the evolution of the First Amendment right to aca-
demic freedom).
69. 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled iy Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 689
(1967).
70. Adler, 342 U.S. at 490.
71. See Fugate, supra note 68, at 191.
72. Adler, 342 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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loyalty, casting a pall over the classrooms.7" Under such a guise, no
real academic freedom could ever exist.
7 4
In the same year the Court decided Adler, it also invalidated an
Oklahoma statute requiring public employees to take a loyalty oath
swearing that they had not associated with particular organizations.75
In Wieman v. Updegraff the Court distinguished Adler by noting that
the Oklahoma oath statute in question denied state employment to
persons solely on the basis of membership in an organization, regard-
less of whether association existed "innocently or knowingly. ' 76 The
New York law at issue in Adler, in contrast, specified that removal of a
public employee was only permissible after a finding that the em-
ployee belonged to an organization advocating the overthrow of the
government by violent or illegal means. 77 The Wieman Court differen-
tiated the two cases by holding that "[i] ndiscriminate classification of
innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary
power."7 1 Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion in Wieman,
continued to profess the virtues of academic freedom, stating that
teachers "must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought
and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the
checkered history of social and economic dogma. 79
The first major case recognizing constitutional protections for ac-
ademic freedom was Sweezy v. New Hampshire."° In Sweezy, a conflict
arose when the attorney general of New Hampshire, acting under an
authority to investigate subversive activities, subpoenaed Paul Sweezy,
a college professor, to answer questions about his past conduct and
associations."1 The following often cited passage in ChiefJustice War-
ren's plurality decision sets forth the virtues and constitutional protec-
tions afforded to academic freedom:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underesti-
mate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any straight jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of educa-
73. See id. at 510.
74. See id.
75. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
76. See id. at 191.
77. See Adler, 342 U.S. at 490.
78. Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191.
79. Id. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
81. See id. at 238.
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tion is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discov-
eries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the
social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.82
While mainly dicta, the preceding passage is significant because it
provided a foundation for the landmark case involving academic free-
dom which followed ten years after Sweezy. 83
The Court ultimately recognized academic freedom as a "special
concern of the First Amendment" and, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents
of University of the State of New York, it repudiated prior jurisprudence
upholding restrictions on academic freedom. 4 In this landmark deci-
sion, the Court revisited the New York law at issue in Adler and de-
clared it unconstitutional.85 The Keyishian holding was rooted in both
the dicta of Justice Warren's opinion in Sweezy and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Douglas in Adler. 6 The Keyishian Court expressly
recognized academic freedom as a constitutionally protected right:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is there-
fore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of
ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to the robust exchange of ideas
82. Id. at 250.
83. The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy is also regarded as impor-
tant for its articulation of four essential freedoms that a university possesses:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most condu-
cive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail the four essential freedoms of a university-to determine for itself on aca-
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study.
Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). These four essential freedoms constitute the uni-
versity's academic freedom. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312
(1978).
84. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
85. Id. at 609.
86. See generally Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Adler v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."8
In addition to preserving First Amendment rights of teachers and
academics, Keyishian is also important because it emphasized the im-
portance of academic freedom to society as a whole."8 While not di-
rectly addressed, the Court indicated that the First Amendment right
to receive speech held by the general public is threatened when
faculty are restricted in their ability to critically inquire because aca-
demic freedom is of "transcendent value to all of us."89
The Keyishian Court also provided a framework for future analysis
of public employee speech:
Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with nar-
row specificity .... When one must guess what conduct or
utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will steer
far wider of the unlawful zone ... If] or the threat of sanc-
tions may deter [ ] almost as potently as the actual applica-
tion of sanctions. The danger of that chilling effect upon
the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded
against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what
is being proscribed.9"
Thus, general statutes or policies restricting faculty speech will not be
tolerated under the academic freedom rubric.
Academic Freedom as a special concern of the First Amendment
and of the Court has recently become an issue as legislatures and pub-
lic employers have successfully restricted the speech of public employ-
ees, including teachers.91  While the Court has not expressly
withdrawn its position regarding the First Amendment protection af-
forded to academic freedom, its present analysis and mandates con-
cerning public employee speech must be considered when evaluating
present academic freedom issues.
87. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604 (citations omitted).
88. See id. at 603 ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment . .
89. Id.
90. Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
91. SeeWaters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 676-77 (1994) (providing the public employer
with the ability to determine itself whether employee speech is protected and holding that
a public employee might be fired for disruptive speech based on a reasonable belief of
what the employee's speech entailed); see also, e.g., Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.2d 9, 13 (2d
Cir. 1995) (upholding an adverse action taken by public university officials against a ten-
ured professor for certain potentially disruptive remarks made during an off-campus
speech).
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III. THE UNIVERSITY AS A PUBLIC EMPLOYER
Public universities are public employers, and as such, are subject
to the traditional public employee doctrine developed by the Court
for analyzing First Amendment cases arising in the workplace.92 In
fact, the public employee doctrine evolved from cases addressing the
free speech rights of teachers and was subsequently expanded to in-
corporate all public employment positions." When evaluating In-
ternet access issues in the public employee domain, the public
employee doctrine should be the starting point of any analysis used to
resolve such cases consistent with the precedent set forth by the Su-
preme Court. Applying the doctrine to speech of academics at public
universities, however, will require a modified version of the doctrine
in order to remain consistent with the First Amendment protections
afforded to academic freedom.94
A. The Supreme Court Public Employee Speech Doctrine
1. The Pickering Balancing Test: The Court's Initial Approach to Ad-
dresing First Amendment Rights of Public Employees.-The Supreme Court
first directly addressed the First Amendment free speech rights of
state employees in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of
New York. The Keyishian Court upheld the Second Circuit's conclusion
that, "the theory that public employment which may be denied alto-
gether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unrea-
sonable, has been uniformly rejected."95 While mainly regarded as an
"academic freedom" case,96 Keyishian is also significant with regard to
public employee free speech because it was the high court's first di-
rect attempt to breach the topic. Not until the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,97 however, did the
Court expressly address the issue of public employee speech rights.
92. See, e.g., Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997); Trotman v. Board of Trust-
ees, 635 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1980); Adamian v.Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975); Urof-
sky v. Gilmore, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998); Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425
(C.D. Ill. 1996); Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist., 918 F. Supp. 1475 (D. Wyo. 1996).
93. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (a case involving a public
teacher who filed suit against the state for being dismissed based on the content of his
speech).
94. See infta notes 185-186 (discussing a modified test which courts should use when
addressing speech of academics at public universities).
95. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90 (discussing Keyishian as an academic free-
dom case).
97. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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Pickering established a test for the judicial analysis of alleged viola-
tions of public employees' First Amendment speech rights. The Picker-
ing test has been modified and supplemented by subsequent
decisions, but the basic tenets still remain good law today.98
The plaintiff, Mr. Pickering, was an Illinois public high school
teacher dismissed from his job for writing and sending a letter to a
local newspaper speaking out against school bond issues, educational
spending proposals, and teachers' ability to participate in the fund-
raising and spending process.9 9 The Court held that the question of
whether a school system requires additional funds is a legitimate pub-
lic concern about which teachers should be able to speak freely with-
out fear of retaliatory dismissal. 100 The Pickering Court established
what has become known as the "Pickering balancing test" in the follow-
ing passage:
It cannot be said that the State has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ signifi-
cantly from those it possesses in connection with the regula-
tion of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem
in any case is to arrive at a balancing between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.1"1
As applied, the Pickering balancing test weighs matters of public
concern that an employee's speech seeks to address against any ad-
verse effects the speech might have on agency efficiency. 10 2 Where
the nature of the employee's speech outweighs the speech's adverse
effects on agency operations, the employee's First Amendment speech
right prevails, regardless of the legitimacy of the employer's interests
in regulating the particular speech. 103 In Pickering, the Court recog-
nized the teacher's prevailing First Amendment right and held that
where "the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially
involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a
98. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465-66
(1995) (referring to Pickering and its progeny as establishing the appropriate test for exam-
ining disciplinary actions taken in response to a public employee's speech).
99. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
100. See id. at 571-73.
101. Id. at 568.
102. See Richard Hiers, Public Employees' Free Speech: An Endangered Species of First Amend-
ment Rights in Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
169, 178 (1993) (discussing the application of the Pickering balancing test).
103. See Hiers, supra note 102, at 178-79.
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teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the
member of the general public he seeks to be."1 °4
The Supreme Court subsequently applied the Pickering balancing
test to several cases during the course of the 1970s in an effort to
further develop the public employee free speech doctrine. 10 5 For the
most part, however, the original test remained intact. 10 6 The emerg-
ing line of cases from lower courts indicated that public employees
could often succeed in vindicating their speech rights. Moreover, the
development of case law suggested that the balancing test, and subse-
quent modifications thereof, contained no "built-in biases in favor of
arbitrary or tyrannical superiors." 0 7 As such, it was inevitable that the
Supreme Court would eventually revisit the Pickering doctrine and
modify it further to allow public employers broader authority and dis-
cretion to manage their personnel.
2. Post-1983 Decisions by the Supreme Court Addressing First Amend-
ment Rights of Public Employees.-The Supreme Court revisited the
Pickering doctrine in Connick v. Myers'08 and developed a new test for
determining when public employee speech addressed a matter of pub-
lic concern. Ms. Shiela Myers, the plaintiff and respondent, was an
assistant district attorney in New Orleans, Louisiana. 0 9 Ms. Myers was
informed by her superior that she would be transferred to a different
division of the Criminal Court."0 Myers strongly opposed the pro-
posed transfer and voiced her view to several of her supervisors, in-
cluding the District Attorney, Mr. Harry Connick."' No alteration
was made in the plan to transfer Myers, so in retaliation, Myers formu-
lated and distributed a questionnaire to solicit "the views of her fellow
staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee," and other office issues."1 2 Shortly
after Myers distributed the questionnaire, Connick became aware of
what Myers had done and terminated her employment with his of-
fice.1 1 3 Myers subsequently filed suit in federal court claiming that
104. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
105. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
106. See supra note 98.
107. Hiers, supra note 102, at 233.
108. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
109. Id. at 140.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 140-41.
113. Id. at 141.
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she had been wrongfully terminated "because she had exercised her
constitutionally protected right of free speech."' 14
Finding in favor of the petitioner, District Attorney Connick, the
Court held that
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circum-
stances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by
a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behavior.' 15
The Connick Court employed the standard set forth in Pickering and its
progeny in stating that "if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly char-
acterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is
unnecessary for [the Court] to scrutinize the reasons for her dis-
charge." '116 According to the Court, its "responsibility is to ensure that
citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working
for the government."11 As such, the judiciary should not intrude in
the manner in which government officials manage their offices unless
"employee expression [can] be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. ' 18
The Connick Court further defined the test for determining when
or whether public speech addressed a matter of public concern in stat-
ing: "[W] hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record." ' This more nar-
row view on speech of public concern greatly limited the number of
public employee free speech cases going to trial because judges served
as gatekeepers by examining employees' motivation or purpose in
speaking to determine whether speech addressed a matter of public
concern.12 ° In limiting the recognition of speech of public concern,
114. Id.
115. Id. at 147.
116. Id. at 146.
117. See id. at 147.
118. Id. at 146.
119. Id. at 147-48.
120. See Hiers, supra note 102, at 241. Under Connick, judges were permitted to dismiss
cases before engaging in a Pickering balancing analysis if, in the judge's opinion, the em-
ployee's statement was merely a grievance and not a matter of public concern warranting
First Amendment protection. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (stating that "the First Amend-
ment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints
over internal office affairs").
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the Court shifted the balancing test of Pickering to favor an employer's
authority to regulate its employees' speech,
21
Four years after Connick, the Court further clarified the public
employee speech doctrine in Rankin v. McPherson.122 Ms. McPherson,
a clerical employee in the constable's office in Harris County, Texas,
was fired because she was overheard saying the following words to a
co-worker after an attempted assassination of the President of the
United States: "I hope if they go for [the president] again, they get
him." 2
3
The Rankin Court began its analysis by stating that "whether Mc-
Pherson's speech may be 'fairly characterized as constituting speech
on a matter of public concern"' is the "threshold question."'1 24 In so
stating, the Court closed the door on a question that had been left
unanswered by previous opinions and clarified that "absent the most
unusual circumstances," a federal court is only an appropriate forum
when it is called upon to review a case involving a public employee's
speech that touches upon a matter of public concern.
125
The Court in Rankin also established that "[t] he State bears a bur-
den ofjustifying [an employee] discharge on legitimate grounds.11 26
This justification takes place in the state interest element of the bal-
ancing test which "focuses on the effective functioning of the public
employer's enterprise." 127 Given the function of the constable's of-
fice, Ms. McPherson's position in the office, and the nature of her
speech, the Court concluded that Mr. Rankin's interest in discharging
her did not outweigh Ms. McPherson's right to free speech under the
First Amendment. 1 28
Two recent cases have added additional elements to the public
employee free speech doctrine which require brief consideration.
Waters v. Churchill29 involved the termination of a nurse for engaging
in a conversation during which she criticized various aspects of her
121. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public
Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1109, 1121 (1988) (arguing that the requirement that
public employee speech be on a matter of public concern as a threshold standard demon-
strates a disproportionate concern for the government employer's interest in managing
the workplace).
122. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
123. Id. at 380-81.
124. Id. at 385 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
125. Id. at 384-85 n.7.
126. Id. at 388.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 392.
129. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
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department. 3 ' The Waters Court clarified the difference between the
government acting in a capacity as sovereign verses that of an em-
ployer by stating:
The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively
and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant
one when it acts as employer. The government cannot re-
strict the speech of the public at large just in the name of
efficiency. But where the government is employing someone
for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such
restrictions may well be appropriate."'
More importantly, Waters established the proposition that a per-
son has a right to a reasonable investigation prior to dismissal for
speech.1 32 The government has the burden to investigate and show
that the speech would be disruptive in some situation before the
speaker may be punished.1 3 3 Hence, Waters added a procedural com-
ponent to First Amendment analysis of public employee speech cases.
The second important case in recent Supreme Court history deal-
ing with public employee speech is United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union.13 1 In NTEU, the Court held that a statute disallowing
public employees to accept honorariums for engaging in extra-em-
ployment activities, such as writing articles and making speeches, was
unconstitutional regardless of the activity's relationship to the per-
son's official employment duties. 135 The Court determined that the
government has a heavy burden in justifying the necessity of a statute
restricting the speech of public employees in their private lives outside
the scope of employment.1 6 In so doing, the Court established crite-
ria the government must meet to successfully defend legislation aimed
at speech of employees. 137 The Court specified that
when the Government defends a regulation on speech as a
means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it
must do more than simply "posit the existence of the disease
sought to be cured." . . . It must demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regula-
130. See id. at 664-68.
131. Id. at 675.
132. See id. at 682 (stating that "[a] reasonable factfinder" should have the opportunity
to hear the case).
133. See id. at 674.
134. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
135. See id. at 457-61.
136. See id. at 475-76.
137. See id. at 475.
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tion will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way.
13 8
Government speculation that serious harm will result absent the sup-
pression of employee speech, therefore, is insufficient to justify a "rea-
sonable burden" on employee expression.1 39 The government must
instead affirmatively show that there is a reasonable ground to believe
serious harm will result if certain free speech is left unsuppressed."4 °
B. Urofsky v. Allen: An Internet Free Speech Case Involving the Public
Employee Speech Doctrine
A prime example of an Internet free speech case involving public
employees emerged in the recently decided U.S. District Court case of
Urofsky v. Allen."' The source of plaintiffs' constitutional concerns in
Urofsky was Va. Code § 2.1-804 et seq., entitled "Restrictions on State
Employee Access to Information Infrastructure" (the Act).142 The Act
restricts the ability of Virginia state employees to access and view sexu-
ally explicit material on state-owned or leased computer equip-
ment.143 Section 2.1-805, the central provision of the Act, provides
that
[e]xcept to the extent required in conjunction with a bona
fide, agency-approved research project or other agency-ap-
proved undertaking, no agency employee shall utilize
agency-owned or agency-leased computer equipment to ac-
cess, download, print or store any information infrastructure
files or services having sexually explicit content. Such agency
approvals shall be given in writing by agency heads, and any
such approvals shall be available to the public under the pro-
visions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.144
Section 2.1-804 of the Act defines "sexually explicit" content to
include: "(i) any description of or (ii) any picture, photograph, draw-
ing, motion picture film, digital image or similar visual representation
depicting sexual bestiality, a lewd exhibition of nudity, as nudity is
138. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (dealing with
the direct regulation of communication by private entities, but one whose logic, the Court
stated, applies equally to "the special burden [which the statute on point in NTEU] im-
poses on the expressive rights of the multitude of employees it reaches.")).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd, Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir.
1999), decision vacated upon grant of rehearing en banc on June 3, 1999.
142. Id. at 635; see also VA. CODE § 2.1-804 (Michie Supp. 1998).
143. See Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 635.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805 (1996).
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defined in §18.2-390,145 sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-
masochistic abuse, as also defined in §18.2-390, coprophilia, urophilia,
or fetishism." '146
While the Act prohibits unauthorized state employee access to
sexually explicit material on state computers, employees retain un-
restricted access to such material using their personal or other com-
puters.147 Furthermore, by the terms of the Act, state employees are
free to petition their agency head for permission to access sexually
explicit material on state computers if such access is necessary to ad-
vance a bona fide research project or other endeavor.1 4
The plaintiffs in Urofsky are six professors at various Virginia state
colleges and universities. 4 ' Their primary claim is that the Act un-
constitutionally infringes upon their First Amendment right to free-
dom of expression by hindering their ability to perform their
fundamental employment responsibilities: teaching and research-
ing. 150 For example, the plaintiffs contend that the Act interferes with
their ability to assign students online research assignments on "inde-
cency" law; to post materials on gender roles and sexuality on web-
sites; and to access various research materials related to scholarly
pursuits. 151
145. Section 18.2-390 of Virginia's Criminal Code provides further definitions for the
Act:
Nudity means a state of undress so as to expose the human male or female geni-
tals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing
of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof
below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered or uncovered male geni-
tals in a discernibly turgid state; Sexual excitement means the condition of human
male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; Sexual
conduct means actual or explicitly simulated acts of masturbation, homosexuality,
sexual intercourse, or physical contact in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or
gratification with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or if such be female, breast; and Sadomasochistic abuse means actual or explicitly
simulated flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in
undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390 (1996) (emphasis added).
146. Id. § 2.1-804 (1996).
147. See Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 635.
148. See id. at 636; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805 (1996).
149. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 635.
150. See id.
151. See id. Other particular examples of the Act's interference with plaintiffs' First
Amendment right to free speech include: concern about the ability to access Virginia's
database of sexually explicit poetry such that research can be continued into the "fleshy
school" of Victorian poets; studies of lesbian and gay issues; and the reluctance to use the
Internet to continue psychological research on human sexuality. Id.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding
that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with state employees' pro-
tected First Amendment rights.' 52 The district court reasoned that
while the Act's broad definition of "sexually explicit" content includes
"obscene speech," which does not enjoy First Amendment protec-
tion,"'5 the breadth of that definition also includes "speech on mat-
ters of public concern entitled to First Amendment protection under
the Pickering balancing test."15 4 The district court further concluded
that "[g] iven the over-and underinclusiveness of the Act and the exis-
tence of content-neutral alternatives,. .. the Act [did] not constitute a
'reasonable response' to [Virginia's] legitimate interests [of work-
place efficiency and the avoidance of a hostile work environment]
under the Pickering/NTEU standard." '155
Moreover, the district court explained that
the ability of more than 101,000 public employees at all
levels of state government to read, research, and discuss sex-
ually explicit topics within their areas of expertise [is at
stake] ... [and] [e] qually at stake is the right of the public to
receive and benefit from the speech of state employees on
matters within their areas of expertise.' 56
This evaluation of the stakes involved in restricting Internet access im-
plies that the right of state employees and the general public to re-
ceive speech on sexually explicit topics was the underlying concern of
the district court in Urofsky. While the district court discussed the stat-
ute's threat to the right of the general citizenry to receive speech pro-
duced by government employees,' 57 it failed to specifically address the
right of government employees themselves to receive sexually explicit
152. Id. at 644. Subsequent to the district court's decision in Urofsky, the State appealed
to the Fourth Circuit to consider whether the district court properly granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1999) (decision
vacated upon grant of rehearing en banc (June 3, 1999)). Specifically, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the Act restricted state employees in their work-related capacity in a
manner inconsistent with the protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. See id. at 194.
153. See id. at 636 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)); see also discussion
supra notes 59-64 (discussing Miller standard).
154. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 636.
155. Id. at 643.
156. Id. at 638.
157. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court's precedents "have focused 'not only on
the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role
in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information
and ideas'" (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (quoting First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)))).
1420 [VOL. 59:1398
COMMENTS
material based on a First Amendment right to receive information, and
how such a right would relate to the public employee doctrine.""8 In-
stead, the district court focused its attention on the right of public
employees to "speak on matters of public concern" incorporating sex-
ually explicit resources from state owned or leased computers, per the
terminology of Pickering and its progeny. The problem with this par-
ticular approach, however, is that the statute did not restrict the ability
of public employees to "speak on" matters of public concern, at least
not directly. The court should have realized that the right of state
employees to produce speech is secondary to their right to receive
that speech; such an ability to speak is only implicated by the statute to
the degree that it restricts employees' access to sexually explicit infor-
mation and ideas.' 59 By blending together the First Amendment in-
terest in producing speech with the First Amendment interest in
receiving speech, the interest of the plaintiffs most directly at stake in
the case was improperly identified by the court and denied adequate
safeguards to protect it from future encroachment.
In order to correctly address Internet access free speech issues
similar to those raised by the plaintiffs in Urofsky, it is necessary to
reformulate the Supreme Court's balancing equation to incorporate
both the right to receive speech and the constitutional protection af-
forded to academic freedom, a doctrine ignored by the district court
in Urofsky.160
IV. A SUGGESTED FORM OF ANALYSIS FOR APPROACHING FIRST
AMENDMENT EMPLOYEE INTERNET ACCESS CASES IN THE
PUBUC ACADEMIC SETTING
The Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of
Americans to receive a full range of information in order to stimulate
well-informed public discourse,1 61 and of faculty to have academic
158. See id. at 640. The Court did briefly mention that the Act also infringes on employ-
ees' ability to inform themselves in stating that "[the Act] inhibits [ ] employees from ob-
taining the information needed to inform their views," but the court went no further with
this analysis and failed to indicate how it might weigh into the Pickering balancing test. See
id.
159. See Wagner, supra note 11, at 675.
160. Even though the plaintiffs were all professors at various Virginia state colleges and
universities, the district court may have consciously decided to avoid discussing academic
freedom because the statute on point was targeted at all public employees and not just
faculty members.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 13-53 (discussing the First Amendment right to
receive information).
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freedom to inquire and study.'6 2 Analyzing Internet access cases in
the academic setting solely under the rubric of the current public em-
ployee speech doctrine is illogical because the balancing test derived
from Pickering and its progeny ignores the protections afforded to aca-
demic freedom and focuses on the right of the employee to dissemi-
nate certain speech, a right separate from the employee's right to
receive the same speech. The balancing test need not be abandoned
altogether, but it must be expanded to incorporate into the balancing
equation a faculty member's right to receive speech and the general
public's right to receive speech of the faculty member.
This Comment proposes that courts begin their analysis of public
faculty free speech cases involving the Internet by determining
whether the challenged statute, policy, or public employer action in-
volves restrictions on access to or the dissemination of certain speech via
the Internet. If a court determines that the case involves the right of
faculty to access information, then the burden on the government to
justify the necessity of the restrictive measure should be extremely
high given the special role of professors and the virtues of academic
freedom recognized by the Court. A modified version of the Pickering
balancing test should be applied in such instances to weigh the con-
tent-neutral interests of the government employer in restricting access
to certain speech against the faculty employee's right to academic
freedom. Cases involving the right of faculty to use public computer
resources for the dissemination of speech to other people, however,
should activate a more traditional and literal application of the Picker-
ing balancing test, since that test was specifically designed for analyz-
ing the protection afforded to the dissemination of public employee
speech.163 Still, any restriction applied in the academic context
should be deemed constitutionally proper only if the government puts
forth a substantial work-related rationale for overriding First Amend-
ment rights of faculty members to disseminate certain speech or of
the general citizenry to receive the speech of faculty.' 64
162. See supra text accompanying notes 66-91 (discussing the First Amendment protec-
tion afforded to academic freedom).
163. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (explaining the balancing
test in terms of balancing the public employee's interest in "commenting" upon matters of
public concern with the interest of the government in promoting the efficiency of the
workplace).
164. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (stating that when a court has
determined that the employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern, "[t]he State
bears a burden ofjustifying the discharge on legitimate grounds." (citing Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983))).
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A. The Right of Faculty to Access the Internet Using Public Computer
Resources for Purposes of Receiving Speech
The express free speech guarantee of the First Amendment in-
cludes the right of the people to make use of the Internet to receive
information without unwarranted governmental regulation which im-
pinges upon the flow of ideas.1" 5 Such a right is unequivocal in situa-
tions where the government is acting as sovereign. The Court has left
it unclear, however, whether such a right extends to situations where
the government is acting as an employer.' 66 In its public employee
line of cases, the Court never specifically opined on whether the bal-
ancing process should afford a greater weight to a faculty member's
interest in academic freedom than to a typical public employee's in-
terest in speech. As a result, lower courts have adapted the balancing
test to fit the academic context without the benefit of Supreme Court
guidance. 67 While a public employer does not have to provide In-
ternet access to its faculty-member employees, 168 once an employer
makes the forum available, any restriction imposed on its use that cur-
tails a faculty-member's ability to receive speech activates First Amend-
ment protections, including academic freedom. 69 Because faculty
165. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-79 (1997) (explaining that adults have the
right to access on the Internet all the offensive materials which they would like, and the
government cannot justify broad suppression of speech addressed to adults based on some
secondary interest).
166. In Waters v. Churchill the Court stated that "[t]he Government's interest in achiev-
ing its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate
interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as an employer." Waters
v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994). While Waters involved an application of the Picker-
ing-Connick balancing test to a non-university setting, it demonstrates the Court's separa-
tion of government into two distinct roles, sovereign and employer, when addressing First
Amendment rights of public employees.
167. See, e.g., Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997); Trotman v. Board of Trust-
ees, 635 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1980); Adamian v.Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975); Urof-
sky v. Gilmore, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998); Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425
(C.D. Ill. 1996); Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist., 918 F. Supp. 1475 (D. Wyo. 1996).
168. From a practical standpoint, all public universities should provide computer re-
sources and Internet access to their faculty. See Ray August, Gratus Dictum! The Limits of
Academic Free Speech on the Internet, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 46 (1998) (arguing that
universities must provide computers and Internet access to their faculty because it is the
responsibility of the faculty to provide students with computer literacy which is a prerequi-
site to succeeding in modern society).
169. An analogy can be made to the world of federal court jurisdiction. The text of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution affords Congress the power to regulate the jurisdiction
of the lower courts. Once jurisdiction has been granted to the lower federal courts, how-
ever, Congress may not direct the courts on how to exercise their decision-making author-
ity with respect to the particular grant ofjurisdiction. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481
U.S. 828 (1987) (holding that if a court is given the authority to act against a party, it must
also be given the power to hear all constitutional defenses/arguments); U.S. v. Klein, 80
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members at public institutions are public employees, they are subject
to the traditional public employee doctrine developed by the Court;
however, in order to be consistent with the Court's stance on First
Amendment protections afforded to the right to receive speech and
academic freedom, the balancing formula should be reformulated
when addressing faculty Internet access cases arising in public aca-
demic institutions.
The threshold question under the Supreme Court's public em-
ployee speech doctrine is whether the speech at issue may be "fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public con-
cern."17 This threshold requirement is necessary, as illustrated by the
Court in Pickering, Connick and Rankin, to avoid extending constitu-
tional protection to speech which has a disruptive impact on the work-
place environment and to avoid impairing government managerial
authority by permitting government disciplinary actions to be re-
viewed by the judiciary. 17' Determining whether an employee's
speech addresses a matter of public concern is made, according to the
Court, by looking at the "content, form and context of a given state-
ment, as revealed by the whole record."' 72 The public concern re-
quirement as a threshold test to determine whether a federal court is
the appropriate forum for reviewing a public employee speech case
still applies to the right to receive speech; but, instead of looking to
the nature of the speech being disseminated by the employee, a court
should look to the speech being received to determine whether it in-
volves a matter of public concern.
It is hard to imagine an example of speech produced by a faculty
member in the course of fulfilling his or her employment responsibili-
ties as an academic which "cannot be fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. "173
U.S. 128 (1871) (if courts are given jurisdiction, Congress cannot tell them how to con-
sider a case). Similarly, once the government extends computer use to faculty members at
a public institution, the specific content associated with that use should only be regulated
by the tenets of the First Amendment as they exist in the "non-workplace" environment. A
government should not be permitted to "puppeteer" academics by providing computers
but regulating their use by barring the receipt of otherwise constitutional speech.
170. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146 (1983)).
171. See Lee, supra note 121, at 1121-24 (discussing the rationale behind the threshold
public concern requirement created by the Court); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147 (1983) (holding that "when a public employee speaks... as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest, . . . a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee's behavior").
172. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
173. Id. at 146.
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Hence, it follows that the speech which a faculty member seeks out to
evaluate a subject and form his or her own conclusions prior to speak-
ing out through publication, lecture, or otherwise, must likewise be
on a matter of public concern. A court's refusal to review a public
faculty free speech case involving the Internet because the speech
sought to be researched on the Internet fails to be on a matter of
public concern, therefore, would be a rare occasion.1 74 Any such re-
fusal of review in order to avoid the impairment of government mana-
gerial authority would be improper because a university would be
permitted to arbitrarily dismiss faculty for merely exercising their First
Amendment rights without being forced to justify themselves via the
second part of the public employee doctrine, namely the Pickering bal-
ancing test.1 7
The extent to which government can restrict speech deemed to
address a matter of public concern necessitates a consideration on
whether the speech is being received in an employee's work-related
capacity, or as a private citizen outside the scope of employment. Ac-
cording to the Court, the government has a heavy burden in justifying
speech restrictions which touch on the private lives of their employees
where the government is acting in the role of sovereign and not em-
ployer.1 76 On the other hand, when speech on a matter of public
concern relates solely to the employee's work environment or job re-
sponsibilities and not in the employee's capacity as a private citizen,
the burden imposed on government to justify restrictions on speech is
substantially less. Still, the Picketing balancing test must be used to
determine whether the employment-related speech should be pro-
tected under the First Amendment or yield to employer interests.1 7 7
174. The only obvious area of speech that does not warrant First Amendment protection
is obscene speech per the definition and standards established by the Court in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); as such, a court could deem a faculty member's receipt of
purely obscene material to not be on a matter of public concern.
175. See United States v. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) (explaining that where a deter-
mination has been made by a court that the public employee's speech involves a matter of
public concern, "the government bears the burden of justifying its adverse employment
action" (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987))).
176. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 466-71 (discussing the right of public employees to dissemi-
nate speech, and explaining that when public employee speech is made outside the work-
place, and involves content largely unrelated to government employment, the government
has a high burden in justifying broad restrictions on employee expression). The Pickering
balancing test would still be used to test the protection afforded to public employee speech
being restricted outside of the workplace. See id. (applying the Pickering balancing test to a
restriction on speech outside of the workplace).
177. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (applying the Pickering balanc-
ing test to employee's on-thejob statements).
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In Internet-access free speech cases involving nonacademic pub-
lic employees, a court should balance the employee's First Amend-
ment right to receive speech on matters of public concern with the
employer's interests in promoting the operational efficiency of the
workplace to determine the constitutional validity of an Internet ac-
cess restriction. Barring special circumstances, the majority of such
cases should favor the government employer's bona fide interest in
preventing employees from using work time to access speech unre-
lated to the fulfillment of their job responsibilities. The public em-
ployee's constitutional right to receive speech on the Internet,
regardless of content, is unquestionably protected outside of the work-
place where the government is acting in the role of sovereign; but, in
order for the government to successfully and efficiently perform its
responsibilities as an employer, the at-work employee speech must
give way to the interests of the government employer.
Internet access cases brought by faculty at public institutions
should be addressed differently than similar cases concerning other
public employees because the constitutional right to academic free-
dom, in addition to the First Amendment right to receive speech, war-
rants special consideration during the application of the Pickering
balancing test. In attempting to acknowledge the unique role of
professors and the value of academic freedom, some jurisdictions
have altered the balancing test from the onset to require the govern-
ment employer to demonstrate that the public faculty member's
speech poses a substantial disruption to the work environment before it
may be suppressed.178 This approach applied to Internet access cases
would require courts to view any restrictions on faculty members' abil-
ity to receive speech from the Internet with strict scrutiny prior to
engaging in a balancing test analysis. If the government employer
cannot establish that a content-based restriction on Internet access in-
volving matters of public concern is necessary to avoid a substantial
and pronounceable disruption on the work environment, courts
should proceed no further and yield to the academic freedom rights
of professors.
Requiring substantial disruption as a threshold standard prior to
performing a Pickering balancing test, however, is inadequate to com-
pletely protect the academic freedom rights of faculty which the Court
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York labeled a
178. See, e.g., Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring a public univer-
sity to make an initial showing of disruption before the Pickering balancing test ever comes
into play to evaluate whether the speech of faculty can be restricted based on employer
interests).
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"special concern of the First Amendment." 79 If the virtues of aca-
demic freedom are to be preserved, the balancing test itself must favor
a faculty member's right to "remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate." ' A proposal asserted by one commentator for remedying
the inconsistencies between academic freedom and the public em-
ployee speech doctrine is to apply the Supreme Court's decision in
Boos v. Barryt8 ' to the speech of public faculty members in place of the
Pickering balancing test.1 82 This Comment favors a less radical ap-
proach and suggests that the Pickering balancing test instead be simply
modified to incorporate the standard adopted in Boos.
The standard articulated by the Court in Boos permits the govern-
ment to impose restrictive measures on speech so long as the justifica-
tions for regulation have nothing to do with content.'"3 According to
the Boos Court, content-neutral regulations which focus on the "secon-
dary effects" of speech are permissible because the regulatory targets
have nothing to do with suppression of a certain type of speech;
rather, the targets are merely associated activities. 8 4 For example, a
restriction on faculty Internet access to pornography would be accept-
able if the target of the regulation was not the pornography itself, but
instead the secondary effect of protecting the security of the univer-
sity's computers and electronic network from computer viruses com-
monly associated with downloaded pornographic materials. In such
an instance, the regulatory target, preventing harm to university com-
puter resources, has nothing to do with the content of the restricted
speech. The Boos Court also noted that regulations focusing on the
direct impact certain speech has on its listeners are not "secondary
effects" because they target the content of the speech and not an asso-
ciated feature. 8 5 Hence, a public university could not impose restric-
tions on faculty Internet access to pornography for the reason that its
receipt might offend someone inadvertently looking over the shoul-
der of a faculty member viewing pornographic materials on their
computer.
179. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
180. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
181. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). The Court in Boos declared a statute disallowing the display of
political propaganda within five hundred feet of a foreign embassy to be facially unconsti-
tutional. See id. at 334. It viewed the statute as a content-based restriction on political
speech in a public forum which was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est. See id.
182. See Fugate, supra note 68, at 216-17 (proposing an alternative test to the public
employee doctrine when dealing with speech in an academic environment).
183. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 320-21.
184. See id. at 320.
185. See id. at 321.
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The proposed test for judicial review of restrictions on Internet
access to speech by faculty at public universities, thus, consists of three
steps:
Step One: Making an initial determination on whether the
speech being received via the Internet is on a matter of pub-
lic concern. Only speech on matters of public concern is
subject to First Amendment protection.
Step Two: Imposing a threshold requirement to the balanc-
ing test that the government employer demonstrate that the
targeted speech, left unrestricted, would substantially disrupt
the efficiency or effectiveness of the workplace. A finding
that speech received via the Internet would not substantially
disrupt the workplace would invalidate any restriction im-
posed on faculty Internet access to such speech.
Step Three: Applying a modified version of the Pickering bal-
ancing test that incorporates the standard set forth in Boos v.
Barry to weigh the interests of the government employer in
regulating the "secondary effects" of speech received via the
Internet against the First Amendment rights of faculty to aca-
demic freedom and to receive speech. Restrictions which
target the specific content of Internet speech on matters of
public concern accessed by faculty would be per se invalid.
Such a test would serve to uphold the First Amendment protec-
tion which the Court has afforded to academic freedom while still per-
mitting universities to effectively perform their duties as an employer
and maintain control over the workplace environment.
B. The Right of the Public to Receive Information Disseminated by Faculty
Through Public Computer Resources
Regulations imposed on faculty which restrict their ability to dis-
seminate speech on the Internet through e-mail, chat rooms, elec-
tronic bulletin boards, web pages, and other Internet-based forums,
are subject to analysis by federal courts under the traditional public
employee speech doctrine. s6 Similar to the case of public employer
restrictions placed on Internet access to information, the First Amend-
ment protection afforded to academic freedom should be incorpo-
rated into the balancing equation analysis to favor the right of faculty
to disseminate speech on matters of public concern through the In-
186. See, e.g., Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998) (applying the public
employee speech doctrine to invalidate a statute which hampered public employees, in-
cluding faculty members, in their ability to "speak out" using public computer resources).
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ternet. i8 7 Equally as important, however, is acknowledging a First
Amendment right of the general citizenry to receive the speech of
public faculty members and considering the interests of such poten-
tial audiences in the Pickering balancing test.
1 88
Public employees serve an invaluable role in providing the gen-
eral citizenry with information which can be used to formulate opin-
ions and debate on vital social and political topics. Of all public
employees, academics at universities are among the most vital in en-
suring that the citizenry is afforded access to all viewpoints on an is-
sue, regardless of their general acceptance or controversial nature, in
order to foster the self-expression which lies at the heart of the First
Amendment guarantee. Given the fact that the Internet is arguably
the most powerful tool for sharing information ever developed, citi-
zens should not be denied access to faculty speech on matters of pub-
lic concern through that medium barring exigent circumstances.
The interests of potential audiences are an essential component
of the public employee doctrine, and they should be considered when
balancing employer efficiency interests with the First Amendment
right of faculty to disseminate speech on matters of public concern. 189
In doing so, where the faculty interest in speaking may be small com-
pared with the employer's operational efficiency interests but the gen-
eral public's interest in receiving the speech of faculty is significant,
the public's right to receive information should prevail and afford
protection to the faculty speech. As in the Supreme Court case of Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the paramount issue in addressing a pub-
lic faculty member's right to disseminate speech through the Internet
is not the right of the faculty themselves to speak, rather it is the right
of the citizenry to receive academic speech such that the First Amend-
ment goal of producing "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail" can be preserved. 9 °
187. See supra notes 165-185 (discussing a proposal for how academic freedom should
weigh into the balancing portion of the public employee speech doctrine when dealing
with restrictions placed on faculty Internet access to information).
188. The right of the general citizenry to receive faculty speech on the Internet refers to
faculty members' out-of-class speech. Public institutions generally have a right to control
the curriculum and therefore affect how a professor disseminates speech on the Internet
to his or her students (in-class speech). See, e.g., Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist.,
890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that "public school teachers are not free, under
the first amendment, to arrogate control of curricula"). See also supra note 45 (discussing
"standing" of general citizenry to bring suit based on a First Amendment right to receive
the speech of public faculty members).
189. See Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 638 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing United States v.
NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995)).
190. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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Academic freedom is of "transcendent value to [society as a
whole] and not merely to the teachers concerned."' 9 ' Such is the rea-
son why the Court has deemed academic freedom to be a "special
concern of the First Amendment,1' 92 and why courts in applying the
public employee speech doctrine should pay serious consideration to
the citizenry's interest in receiving faculty speech on the Internet.
Conclusion
The Internet is a vehicle for promoting the free exchange of
ideas and expression unlike anything the world has ever known. Im-
posing work-related restrictions on the ability of faculty at public uni-
versities to access and disseminate information on the Internet
deprives the country of valuable speech for furthering the ideals of
democracy. In the past, courts have attempted to protect faculty and
university speech using a host of different legal tests and rationales,
but all have been rooted in the notion that academic freedom is of
constitutional dimension and warrants certain First Amendment safe-
guards. Internet use-restrictions imposed on universities and their
faculty drive at the heart of past concerns over restrictions on aca-
demic speech, and such restrictions should be struck down by courts
absent a necessary and valid reason rooted in a matter of significant
government concern.
The current public employee speech doctrine is inadequate to
address the speech of faculty members and should be reformulated.
A proper doctrine would favor the academic freedom rights of faculty
and the citizenry's constitutional right to receive unrestricted faculty
expression. Only then can the country be protected against the sup-
pression of valuable academic speech and ensure a free and open
marketplace of ideas which the First Amendment was created to
promote.
DAMON L. KRIEGER
191. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
192. Id.
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